CO129-541-11 Cheng Kwok Yau- trial judge's notes 1-1-1932 - 31-12-1932 — Page 11

30 th August, 1932.

Kemo C.J.: refers to Hones v. Newman (1931) 2 Ch. at p.120,

"What is meant.

can be applied".

Kemp C.J.: suggestät as a pprsible way of looking at

the matter the following, res gestae being a doubtful

guide: "In the vast majority of cases the law will accept

"as evidence those matters which are indicated as subh

by the ordinary course of human experience *( quoted by

Potter from 13 Hal abury, p.439:)the Zimmern and Christie

ed evidence would be so indicatải We must therefore look

for some positive ground of exclusion.

Potter: Kes gestae and the exceptional cases such as

system may not cover the whole field, but it is covered

by the three heads of the latter paragraph of pers.611

of p.439 of 13 Halsbury.

The Zimmern and Chris tie evidence cannot be

"probative" of the alleged agency of Lau. Even if the

immern and Christie evidence was that they hired Lau,

that would still be inadmí ssible.

The Crown rested their argument on the second of

Halsbury's classes, "facte showing identity".

The Crown used the Simmern and Christie evidence

as probative of the agency of Lau.

Food F.J.: refers to Stephen's Digest of the Law of

Lvidence, Article 3, and asks "Is not the issue between

you whether there is one story or two.”

Lemp. C.J: I agree, i would also refer to Article 7:

nothing in that article would justify the sdraission of

this evidence.

Fotteri

R. v. Pond (1906) & X.B. 389.

It could not be argued that the Zimmern and Christie

avidence is "part of the transaction which is the

subject of the indictment".

(R. v. Pond. p.400) It